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Making Sense out of the California
Criminal Statute of Limitations
BY GERALD F. UELMEN*
It is thefinding of the Legislature that since its enactment in 1872, Cali-
fornia's basic three-year statute of limitationsforfelonies has been sub-
jected to piecemeal amendment, with no comprehensive examination of
the underlying rationale for the period of limitation, nor its continued
suitability as applied to specific crimes or categories of crimes. In the
estimation of the Legislature it is therefore desirable for the California
Law Revision Commission, on apriority basis, to undertake an in-depth
study of the rationalesfor the statutes of limitationsfor variousfelonies
and the justfcation for the revision of the period of limitations for spe-
cjfc crimes or categories of crime, and to make recommendations to the
Legislature based on the study.
1981 Cal. Stat. c. 909, §3.
The purpose of this report is to assist the California Law Revision
Commission in the monumental task of defining the appropriate con-
siderations that justify the duration of a statute of limitations for spe-
cific crimes or categories of crime. The legislative assessment of the
inadequacy of the present law is certainly warranted. The current stat-
utes, summarized in Appendix I, resemble a patch-work quilt riddled
with inconsistencies. The legislative mandate, however, goes beyond
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles. The author wishes to acknowledge
the assistance of Fred Rarick, Loyola Law School '83, in the preparation of this article. This
article was prepared to provide the California Law Revision Commission with background infor-
mation for its study of this subject. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations contained in
the article are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent or reflect the opinions,
conclusions, or recommendations of the California Law Revision Commission.
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simply eliminating these inconsistencies. A comprehensive framework
is needed to respond appropriately to the pattern of ad hoc legislation
which currently prevails. No less than eleven legislative enactments
have modified the felony statute of limitations since 1969. Many of
these enactments were responses to widely publicized cases in which
the statute of limitations was successfully asserted as a bar to prosecu-
tion. While responding to public outcry is certainly a legitimate legisla-
tive function, the response should also be consistent with rational
principles. When legislation is perceived as an arbitrary "knee-jerk"
reaction, its moral force is lost.
After reviewing the legislative history of the California criminal stat-
ute of limitations from its 1851 origin to the present day, this article
will analyze each of the factors that might be offered to justify a short
limitations period: the staleness factor, the motivation factor and the
repose factor. This will be followed by an analysis of the factors of-
fered to justify a long limitations period or no limitations period at all:
the concealment factor, the investigation factor and the seriousness fac-
tor. The attempt to relate these factors to particular crimes or catego-
ries of crime will be aided by survey responses obtained from
California prosecutors, defense lawyers, and superior court judges.
The respondents were asked to relate specific crimes from the list ap-
pearing in Appendix III to the various factors offered to justify shorter
or longer statutory periods, and to evaluate whether the current limita-
tions period for each of these crimes is too short or too long. The re-
sponses add a dimension of practical experience to our task. The
twenty-six prosecutors responding had an average of twelve years expe-
rience as prosecutors. The twenty-five defense attorneys responding in-
cluded thirteen private defense lawyers, with an average of eighteen
years experience, and twelve public defenders, with an average of
twelve years experience. The seven judges responding had averaged
nine years on the bench. After surveying the upward trend of statutes
of limitations in other jurisdictions, this article will turn to the task of
identifying the inconsistencies in the current California statutes, and
suggest a framework for future legislation based in large part on the
recommendations of the Model Penal Code.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
The basic structure of the California statute of limitations was estab-
lished by the second session of the state legislature in 1851 with a rela-
tively simple enactment:
Section 96. There shall be no limitation of time within which a
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prosecution for murder must be commenced. It may be commenced
at any time after the death of the person killed.
Section 97. An indictment for any other felony than murder must
be found within three years after its commission.
Section 98. An indictment for any misdemeanor must be found
within one year after its commission.
Section 99. If when the offense is committed the defendant be out
of the State, the indictment may be found within the term herein
limited after his coming within the State, and no time during which
defendant is not an inhabitant of, or usually resident within the
State, shall be a part of the limitation.
Section 100. An indictment is found within the meaning of this
Title, when it is duly presented by the Grand Jury in open court, and
there received and filed.'
These provisions were carried over intact into the Penal Code enacted
in 1872, where they appeared as sections 799-803. The subsequent his-
tory of each these Penal Code sections certainly substantiates the legis-
lative finding that "piecemeal amendment" has occurred.
A. No Limitation
Penal Code section 799, originating with section 96 of the 1851 stat-
ute, still enumerates the offenses for which no limitation of time is im-
posed for commencement of prosecution. The offenses of
embezzlement of public monies and falsification of public records were
added in 1891.2 At that time, embezzlement of public moneys and fal-
sification of public records were felonies punishable by one to ten years
in the state prison, as well as by disqualification from holding any state
office. Under the determinate sentencing law adopted in 1976, the
punishment may vary depending upon whether an embezzlement of
public money is prosecuted under Penal Code section 424 (two, three
or four years imprisonment) or Penal Code section 514 (16 months, two
or three years imprisonment).4 Falsification of public records is pun-
ishable by either one year in the county jail, or sixteen months, two or
three years in the state prison under either Penal Code section 473 or
Government Code section 6201. If the offense is committed by the offi-
cial custodian of the record, Government Code section 6200 sets a four
year maximum.
1. 1851 Cal. Stat., c. 29, §§96-100, at 222.
2. 1891 Cal. Stat., c. 141, at §1, at 192.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §§424, 514; 1880 Cal. Stat. c. 42, at 7, c. 88, at 39.
4. 1976 Cal. Stat. c. 1139, §§197, 230, at 5118, 5127. Since no penalty is specified in Penal
Code section 514, Penal Code section 18 applies, which imposes a sentence of sixteen months, two
or three years.
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After the various forms of common-law theft offenses were consoli-
dated by Penal Code section 484,5 the question arose whether a theft of
public funds by false pretenses would also be subject to Penal Code
section 799, and thus subject to prosecution at any time. In People v.
Darling,6 the court answered this question in the negative by holding
that section 799 is strictly limited to thefts in which the traditional ele-
ments of embezzlement are present, involving a breach of a fiduciary
trust.
The crime of kidnapping in violation of Penal Code section 209 was
added to Section 799 in 1970.7 Penal Code Section 209 applies to kid-
napping for ransom, extortion or robbery. In 1970, kidnapping was
punishable by death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole
if the victim suffered bodily harm, and life imprisonment with possibil-
ity of parole in other cases.' In 1977, section 209 was amended to elim-
inate the death penalty.9
B. Three Year Limitation
Penal Code section 800, originating with section 97 of the 1851 stat-
ute, established a limitation of three years after commission for ali felo-
nies not enumerated in section 799. The section now includes two
additional categories of exceptions that have grown with increased fre-
quency in recent years: felonies for which the three year limitations
period commences upon discovery of the crime, rather than upon com-
mission, and felonies for which a limitation period of six years after the
commission is established. The residual limitations period, for all of-
fenses not enumerated in section 799 and not named in either category
of exceptions, remains three years after commission of the crime.
C Three Years After Discovery
The concept of having the statute of limitations commence upon dis-
covery of the crime first was introduced into the California Penal Code
in 1969. Senate Bill 1154, introduced by then Senator George
Deukmejian, amended Penal Code section 800 to provide that "an in-
dictment for grand theft shall be found, an information filed, or case
certified to the superior court within three years after its discovery."' 0
As originally introduced, the proposal was limited to grand theft by
5. 1927 Cal. Stat. c. 619, §1, at 1046.
6. 230 Cal. App. 2d 615, 41 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1964).
7. 1970 Cal. Stat. c. 704, §1, at 1333.
8. 1951 Cal. Stat. c. 1749, §1, at 4167.
9. 1977 Cal. Stat. c. 316, §15, at 1262.
10. 1969 Cal. Stat. c. 1171, §1, at 2266.
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false pretenses, but a later amendment extended the provision to in-
clude all forms of grand theft." Once the three years after discovery
concept was established in the statutory scheme, California legislators
frequently utilized the concept in subsequent legislation. The following
offenses were added to section 800:
1. Forgery in violation of Penal Code section 470, added in 1970.12
2. Voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter in viola-
tion of Penal Code section 192, added in 1971 .1
3. Fraudulent claims against the government, perjury, filing false
affidavits, and conduct by public officials and public administrators
amounting to a conflict of interest in violation of Government Code
section 1090 and 27443, respectively, added in 1972.1'
4. Offering false evidence or preparing false evidence, in violation
of Penal Code sections 132 or 134, added in 1975.'1
5. Fraud in the offer, purchase or sale of securities in violation of
Corporations Code section 25541, and other violations of the Corporate
Securities Law punishable under Corporations Code section 25540, ad-
ded in 1978.16
6. Felony welfare fraud in violation of section 11483 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code, added in 1981.17
7. Felony Medi-Cal fraud in violation of section 14107 of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code, added in 1982.18
D. Six Year Limitation
The enumeration of certain offenses subject to a limitation of six
years after commission began in 1941, when Penal Code section 800
was amended to provide that a prosecution for the acceptance of a
11. Senate Bill 1154 (April 8, 1969) (Amended in Senate, May 29, 1969).
12. 1970 Cal. Stat. c. 704, §2, at 1333.
13. 1971 Cal. Stat. c. 954, §1, at 1860.
14. 1972 Cal. Stat. c. 1046, §2, at 1923. This same legislative enactment made the offense of
conflict of interest by a public administrator a felony/misdemeanor "wobbler," rather than a
straight misdemeanor. Id. This legislation was introduced by Assemblyman Beverly in the wake
of a widely publicized scandal involving the sale of estate property by the public administrator of
Los Angeles County. Assembly Bill 1057 (March 14, 1972); see In re Kristovch, 18 Cal. 3d 468,
556 P.2d 771, 134 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1976).
15. 1975 Cal. Stat. c. 1047, §1, at 2466. This addition was part of a bill that specified the use
of false evidence as grounds for a writ of habeas corpus under Penal Code section 1473. Id. c.
1047, §2, at 2466. The bill apparently was motivated by a widely publicized case in which an
innocent man had been convicted by the use of a forged fingerprint. Criminal Prosecution of the
officer involved had been barred by the statute of limitations. See Moranta, "The Fingerprint that
Lied," COAST MAGAZINE, Dec. 1974, at 62-70.
16. 1978 Cal. Stat. c. 663, §8, at 2133. The maximum penalty for violations of section 25540
was reduced from ten years to three years in 1976, with a misdemeanor alternative remaining
intact. 1976 Cal. Stat. c. 1139, §10, at 5066.
17. 1981 Cal. Stat. c. 1017, §1, at 3925.
18. 1982 Cal. Stat. c. 533, §1, at 39.
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bribe by a public official or a public employee, a felony, must com-
mence within six years after commission of the offense. t9 At the time
of this enactment, four different sections of the Penal Code designated
the acceptance of bribes by public officials as felonies: section 68, appli-
cable to executive officers; section 86, applicable to legislators; section
93, applicable to judicial officers; and section 165, applicable to city and
county officials. With the exception of section 93, these offenses were
all punishable by fourteen years imprisonment and forfeiture of office
under the 1872 Code. Judicial officers, for some unexplained reason,
faced a maximum penalty of ten years, rather than fourteen. The pun-
ishment is currently set at two, three and four years for all four offenses
under the Determinate Sentencing Law.2" Related offenses involving
acceptance of "emolument, gratuity or reward" carry misdemeanor
penalties, and are thus excluded from the applicability of the section
800 six year limitation. These offenses are governed by the one year
limitation of section 801.21
In 1981, three different bills amending Penal Code section 800 were
enacted by the legislature, adding a variety of rape related offenses to
the six year limitations period. One year earlier, the section had been
amended to provide a five year limitations period for violations of sec-
tion 288 of the Penal Code, which punishes lewd acts with a child
under age fourteen by a prison term of three, six or eight years.22 In
1980, widespread publicity was given to the case of the "College Ter-
race" rapist in Palo Alto, California. Melvin Carter confessed to sev-
enty rapes in six counties over a ten year period. Many of the rapes
were within the statute of limitations, and Carter eventually pled guilty
to thirteen counts of rape and is now serving a twenty-five year prison
sentence. The victim of a rape which occurred more than three years
earlier strenuously objected that her case could not be prosecuted.23
On January 1, 1981, Assemblyman Byron D. Sher, who represents
Palo Alto, introduced Assembly Bill 30 which would have added rape
in violation of Penal Code section 261 to the five year category estab-
lished for section 288 one year earlier. By subsequent amendment, the
period for both offenses was extended to six years, and the bill was
"double joined"24 with two Senate Bills adding Penal Code sections
264.1, 289, subdivisions (c), (d) and (f) of section 286, and subdivisions
19. 1941 Cal. Stat. c. 1113, §1, at 2816.
20. 1976 Cal. Stat. c. 1139, §§104, 109, 111, 128, at 5089, 5090, 5091, 5096.
21. CAL. PENAL CODE §§70, 94.
22. 1980 Cal. Stat. c. 1307, §2, at 4422.
23. See Peninsula Times Tribune, Jan. 23, 1981, at B-I, col. 1; Interview with Thomas J.
Nolan, Jr. (March 7, 1983). (Notes on file with the author).
24. "Double Joining" is a legislative device used to establish the priority of conflicting bills
enacted during the same legislative session. See People v. Henderson, 107 Cal. App. 3d 475, 494,
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(c), (d) and (f) of section 288a to the six year limitations period.25
These Penal Code sections establish the following offenses and
penalties:
Section 261
Section 264.1
Section 286(c)
Section 286(d)
Section 286(f)
Section 288a(c)
Section 288a(d)
Section 288a(f)
Section 289(a)
Section 289(b)
- Rape: three, six or eight years.
- Rape Acting in Concert: five, seven or nine
years.
- Sodomy by force or with person under age
14: three, six or eight years.
- Sodomy Acting in Concert: five, seven or
nine years.
- Sodomy with Unconscious Victim: up to
one year in county jail or sixteen months,
two or three years.
- Oral Copulation by force or with persons
under age 14: three, six or eight years.
- Oral Copulation Acting in Concert: five,
seven or nine years.
- Oral Copulation with Unconscious Victim:
up to one year in county jail or sixteen
months, two or three years.
- Rape by Foreign Object: three, six or eight
years.
- Rape by Foreign Object of a person who is
incapable, through lunacy or other
unsoundness of mind, of giving legal
consent: felony/misdemeanor, punishable by
a maximum of three years imprisonment.26
E One Year Limitation for Misdemeanors
The one year statute of limitations for misdemeanors first created in
section 98 of the 1851 statute remains intact in section 801 of the pres-
ent Penal Code. Some confusion as to the appropriate statute of limita-
tions was created by the category of crimes known as "wobblers,"
which can be punished as either a misdemeanor or a felony, depending
on the discretion of the judge. Penal Code section 17(b)(4) and (5) pro-
vide that these offenses are misdemeanors "for all purposes" when the
complaint specifies that the offense is a misdemeanor or when the mag-
istrate determines that it is a misdemeanor at or before the preliminary
hearing. Relying upon this language, the court in Keener v. Munic#pal
166 Cal. Rptr. 20, 32 (1980); In Re Thierry S., 19 Cal. 3d 727, 739-40, 566 P.2d 610, 616, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 708, 714 (1977).
25. 1981 Cal. Stat. c. 895, c. 901, c. 909.
26. 1981 Cal. Stat. c. 896, §3, at 3416.
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Court of Alameda County27 held that prosecution was barred by the
statute of limitations when a charge of battery on a police officer, filed
as a felony, was reduced to a misdemeanor at the preliminary hearing,
and the charge had been filed more than one year after its commission.
One year later, the legislature changed this result by amending section
801 to provide:
(b) For an offense for which a misdemeanor complaint may be filed
or that may be tried as a misdemeanor, pursuant to paragraphs (4)
and (5) of subdivision (b) of section 17, respectively, a complaint
shall be fied within the time specified in section 800 for such
offense.28
F Tolling of Statute of Limitations
Section 99 of the original Statute of Limitations enacted in 1851 did
not clearly toll the statute for any period of absence from the state. The
section permitted tolling if the offense was committed while the defend-
ant was outside the state. Then, as now, those who were outside the
state at the time a crime was committed could be prosecuted in Califor-
nia under the circumstances delineated in Penal Code section 27.29
Section 99 also excluded from the limitation period any time the de-
fendant was not "an inhabitant of, or usually resident within the state."
While it might be debated whether every "absence" would be excluded
by this language, any ambiguity was resolved by a 1951 amendment to
Penal Code section 802, which now provides that, "no time during
which the defendant is not within this State, is a part of any limitation
of the time for commencing criminal action. 30 California courts have
held that facts showing the defendant's absence from the state must be
alleged in the accusatory pleading to avoid a dismissal if a period in
excess of that allowed by the statute of limitations has elapsed since the
offense was committed. 1
27. 91 Cal. App. 3d 213, 154 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1979).
28. 1980 Cal. Stat. c. 1093, §1, at 3506.
29. CAL. PENAL CODE §27:
(a) The following persons are liable to punishment under the laws of this state:
1. All Persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime within this state;
2. All who commit any offense without this state which, if committed within this state,
would be larceny, robbery, or embezzlement under the laws of this state, and bring the
property stolen or embezzled, or any part of it, or are found with it, or any part of it,
within this state;
3. All who, being without this state, cause or aid, advise or encourage, another person
to commit a crime within this state, and are afterwards found therein.
(b) Perjury, in violation of§I 18, is punishable also when committed outside of Califor-
nia to the extent provided in §118.
30. 1951 Cal. Stat. c. 1674, §23, at 3834.
31. People v. Crosby, 58 Cal. 2d 713, 724-25, 375 P.2d 839, 846, 25 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1962);
Ex Parte McGee, 29 Cal. App. 2d 648, 649, 85 P.2d 135, 136 (1939).
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G. Commencement of Prosecution
When the original statute of limitations was adopted in 1851, all
prosecutions were initiated by indictment. Each section, therefore,
specified that an indictment must be found within the limitations pe-
riod. Section 100 provided that an indictment was "found" when it
was presented by the Grand Jury in open court, received and filed.
That provision still appears as Penal Code section 803. In 1880, when
the Penal Code was amended to permit prosecution by information,32
each section of the statute of limitations was amended to provide that
an indictment must be found or an information filed within the limita-
tions period.33 In 1935, a statute was enacted permitting a defendant to
enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony complaint in the
municipal court, whereupon the magistrate would certify the case to
the superior court for sentencing.34 In these cases, neither an indict-
ment nor an information would ever be filed. To encompass this possi-
bility, the felony statute of limitations was amended to add "or a case
certified to the superior court" to the alternatives for commencement of
prosecution.35 Similarly, the 1933 provision for initiating a misde-
meanor prosecution by "complaint" necessitated an amendment of the
misdemeanor statute of limitations to provide for that alternative to
initiate prosecution.36
Since a pleading in superior court was necessary to commence prose-
cution of felonies for purposes of the statute of limitations, and the
delays necessitated by a preliminary hearing created the risk that the
statutory period might run before an information was filed in superior
court, prosecutors frequently resorted to the use of grand jury indict-
ments when the statute of limitations was dangerously close. A crisis
was created, however, by the decision of the California Supreme Court
in Hawkins v. Superior Court.37 Relying on the equal protection clause
of the California Constitution, the court held that a defendant indicted
by the Grand Jury has a right to a post-indictment preliminary hearing
before the indictment is filed. The legislature responded to this crisis
by creating a bifurcation of the felony statute of limitations in Penal
Code section 800. The alternative that currently is in effect provides
that "an indictment shall be found, or an arrest warrant issued by the
32. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 517-18 (1984) (description of the legislative
history of the amendment). The court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment does not require states to initiate criminal prosecutions by Grand Jury indictment. Id. at
538.
33. 1880 Cal. Stat. c. 47, §8, at 12.
34. 1935 Cal. Stat. c. 141, §2 at 493 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §859a).
35. Id. c. 193, §1, at 856.
36. 1933 Cal. Stat. c. 648, §1, at 1678.
37. 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978).
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municipal or, where appropriate, the justice court" within the limita-
tions period.38 A new section, Penal Code section 802.5, was also en-
acted to provide:
The time limitations provided in this chapter for the commencement
of a criminal action shall be tolled upon the issuance of an arrest
warrant or the finding of an indictment, and no time during which a
criminal action is pending is a part of any limitation of time for re-
commencing that criminal action in the event, of a prior dismissal of
that action, subject to the provisions of section 1387.39
An alternative version, reverting back to the requirement that prosecu-
tion must commence when an indictment is returned, an information is
filed, or a case is certified to the superior court, was also enacted. This
provision will take effect when "a decision of a court of appeal or of the
California Supreme Court becomes final, or an amendment to the Cali-
fornia Constitution takes effect, whichever occurs first which decision
or amendment provides that a person charged by indictment with a
felony is not entitled to a preliminary hearing. '40 Proposals to amend
the constitution to overrule Hawkins have not met with any success in
the legislature, but efforts have been reported to effect a constitutional
amendment through the initiative process.41
FACTORS SUPPORTING A SHORT PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS
Three factors, frequently cited in cases and legal literature as justifi-
cations for the statute of limitations in criminal cases, support a short
period of limitations when they are applicable, as opposed to a long
limitations period or no limitation at all. These factors will be charac-
terized as the staleness factor, the motivation factor, and the repose
factor.
A. The Staleness Factor
The statute of limitations is often viewed as a means of protecting an
accused both from having to face charges based on evidence that may
be unreliable, and from losing access to the evidentiary means to de-
fend against an accusation of crime. "With the passage of time, mem-
ory becomes less reliable, witnesses may die or become otherwise
unavailable; and physical evidence becomes more difficult to obtain,
more difficult to identify, and more likely to become contaminated."42
38. 1981 Cal. Stat. c. 1017, §1.5, at 3926.
39. Id. c. 1017, §3, at 3927.
40. Id. c. 1017, §4, at 3928.
41. Cox, "Criminal Justice Officials Approve Speedy Trial Act," L.A. Daily Journal, Feb. 17,
1983. Part I, at 1.
42. MODEL PENAL CODE §1.07 advisory committee comment (Tent. Draft No. 5).
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The statute of limitations may not be the only protection available
against these risks. In recent years, the constitutional right to due pro-
cess of law has occasionally been utilized by courts to grant relief to a
defendant when delays in the investigation or prosecution of the case
have prejudiced the defendant's ability to defend himself, or when the
prosecution was responsible for the destruction or loss of vital evidence.
In United States v. Marion,43 the Supreme Court rejected a claim that
the sixth amendment right to speedy trial had any application to delays
prior to the institution of formal charges, noting the traditional role of
the statute of limitations in preventing prejudice resulting from the pas-
sage of time between the commission of a crime and the filing of
charges.' The Court left open the possibility, however, that if delay
caused substantial prejudice to a defendant's right to a fair trial and if
that delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage for the
prosecution, the due process clause might require dismissal of the
charges.4" Six years later, in United States v. Lovasco',46 the Supreme
Court made that clear that proof of actual prejudice was a necessary
element of a due process claim but that this proof would not in itself
justify relief without considering the reasons for the delay. The Court
offered little guidance, however, as to what reasons for delay would be
unacceptable, noting that few defendants had succeeded in establishing
that a delay resulted in actual prejudice.47
When evidence essential to the defense is lost or destroyed by the
state, due process may also require dismissal of charges. In People v.
43. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
44. The law has provided other mechanisms to guard against possible as distinguished
from actual prejudice resulting from the passage of time between crime and arrest or
charge. As we said in United States v. Ewell, [383 U.S. 116] at 122, "the applicable
statute of limitations. . . is the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal
charges." Such statutes represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State
and the defendant in administering and receiving justice; they "are made for the repose
of society and the protection of those who may [during the limitation]. . . have lost their
means of defense." Public Schools v. Walker, 9 Wall 282 (1870). These statutes provide
predictability by specifying a time limit beyond which there is an irrebutable presump-
tion that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced. As this Court observed
in Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970): "The purpose of a statute of
limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time
following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal
sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend
themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the pas-
sage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-
distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law
enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity." There is thus
no need to press the Sixth Amendment into service to guard against the mere possibility
that pre-accusation delays will prejudice the defense in a criminal case since statutes of
limitation already perform that function.
Id. at 322-23.
45. Id. at 324.
46. 431 U.S. 783 (1977), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977).
47. 431 U.S. at 796-97.
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Hitch, the California Supreme Court held that the state has a duty to
preserve material evidence and to take reasonable measures to ensure
adequate preservation of the evidence.4 8 This rationale has been ap-
plied to negligent as well as intentional loss of evidence, 49 but it still
only protects the defendant when the loss of evidence is attributable to
state authorities. The concept of due process, therefore, cannot be
viewed as an adequate substitute for the statute of limitations in meet-
ing the concerns embodied in the staleness factor.
The staleness factor may be difficult to relate to specific offenses.
The degree of risk will be determined by the kind of evidence, rather
than the nature of the crime. The survey of prosecutors, defense law-
yers, and judges discussed in this article attempted to ascertain whether
certain types of crimes are more frequently proved by evidence that
becomes less reliable with the passage of time, and whether specific
types of crimes create a greater risk that exculpatory evidence may be
lost with the passage of time. The respondents were asked to select up
to six crimes from a list of twenty-four, that present the greatest risks of
preserving reliable evidence or losing exculpatory evidence. (See Ap-
pendix III for a complete list of the crimes included.) The responses
were remarkably consistent among judges, prosecutors and defense
lawyers. With respect to evidence becoming less reliable, the crimes
most frequently selected appear in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Defense
Crimes Prosecutors (%) Lawyers (%) Judges (%)
1. Child Molesting 80 68 84
2. Rape 48 84 100
3. Robbery 48 56 70
4. Sale of Narcotics 28 52 42
5. Conspiracy 32 48 14
With the exception of conspiracy, which is proven most frequently
through the testimony of co-conspirators, and child molesting, where
the age of the victim presents particular problems of reliability, the
crimes on this list are those in which an eye witness identification is
crucial to the prosecutor's case. The effect of the passage of time on the
reliability of eye witness identification has been well documented in
recent studies. Some research suggests that the passage of time assumes
less significance as more time passes, since loss of memory is most acute
48. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 652-53, 527 P.27 361, 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 17 (1974).
49. People v. Swearingen, 84 Cal. App. 3d 570, 574, 75, 148 Cal. Rptr. 755, 757 (1978).
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in the period immediately following the event, while long term memory
loss is a more gradual process.5 Where an extremely long period of
time elapses between the commission of a crime and an identification
of the perpetrator by the victim, the admissibility of the identification
can be challenged on due process grounds. In Nell v. Biggers,5  the
Supreme Court included "the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation" among the factors to be considered in assessing the reli-
ability of an identification procedure. The issue of whether passage of
time alone would justify suppression of identification testimony, how-
ever, has seldom been addressed by courts. In United States v. Walus,52
the government sought to revoke the defendant's citizenship on the
grounds that he concealed his role in prison camp atrocities as a mem-
ber of the German Gestapo during World War II. He was identified
from photographs thirty-five years after the events took place. The
court noted that "[t]he long time span between the incidents and the
viewings of this exhibit in the mid-1970's would itself require scrutiny
of the identifications, even if they were made under 'laboratory condi-
tions.' " As previously noted, however, due process principles cannot
provide the same degree of protection that the statute of limitations
provides against the risk of unreliable identifications long after the
event.
With respect to the loss of exculpatory evidence, prosecutors tended
to identify the same crimes as those that they considered to be more
frequently proved by evidence that becomes less reliable as time passes.
Defense lawyers, however, placed some different crimes high on the
list. The results appear in Table 2.
50. See LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, (1980); YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWIT-
NESS TESTIMONY, (1980); Ellis, Davis & Shepherd, "'Experimental Studies of Face IdentiFcation,",
3 J. OF CRIM. DEFENSE 219 (1977); Levin & Trapp. "The Pychology of Criminal Identification:
The Gap From Wade to Kirby," 212 U. PA. L. REv. 1078 (1973); Uelmen, "Testing the Assumptions
ofNeil V. Biggers.: An Experiment in Eyewitness Identfication," 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 358 (1980).
51. 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
52. 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 293; see also Nesselson & Lubet, "Eyewitness Identiflcation in War Crimes Trials" 2
CARDOZO L. REV. 71 (1980).
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TABLE 2
Defense
Crime Prosecutors (%) Lawyers (%) e (%)
1. Rape 48 68 70
2. Child Molesting 60 40 28
3. Robbery 48 44 56
4. Murder 36 44 42
5. Burglary 20 44 14
6. Sale of Narcotics 32 36 28
7. Conspiracy 20 36 28
While it is difficult to identify common elements to these offenses, three
possibilities come to mind, and all were mentioned in questionaire re-
sponses by defense lawyers with some frequency. First, just as the
prosecution of many of these crimes depends on eye witness identifica-
tion, the defense may rely upon evidence of another person's identifica-
tion as the perpetrator, which is similarly affected by the passage of
time. Second, the defense that frequently is offered to many of these
crimes is an alibi-the accused was at another location at the time of
the crime. The passage of time makes alibi witnesses more difficult to
locate and also makes those witnesses less certain of specific times that
may be crucial in a case. Third, some of these crimes, especially mur-
der, frequently require the presentation of evidence regarding the de-
fendant's state of mind at the time that the crime was committed, either
as evidence of "diminished capacity" or as part of an insanity defense.
The testimony of psychiatrists and other experts becomes less credible
when they examined the defendant long after the events took place.
B. The Motivation Factor
The Statute of Limitations may be viewed as a "deadline" to moti-
vate efficient police work and insure against bureaucratic delays in in-
vestigating crime. Viewed in this light, the statute imposes a "priority"
upon police and prosecutors to insure the prompt investigation of
crimes that have a shorter limitations period. It has been suggested
that this motivation is unnecessary because the police and prosecutors
are already so overburdened and subjected to such public pressure that
they are compelled to prioritize and give prompt attention to those
crimes about which the public is most concerned. 4 A recent study of
general police investigative techniques lends corroboration to the view
that the statute of limitations may be a negligible factor in motivating
54. Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution,
102 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 633 (1954).
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police investigative activity.55 An intensive study of the Kansas City,
Missouri, Police Department undertaken by Rand Corporation re-
searchers ascertained the percentage of all reported crimes that actually
received the attention of detectives during a six month period. The
results, shown in Table 3, present a graphic picture of police investiga-
tive priorities.56
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF REPORTED CASES
WORKED ON BY DETECTIVES
Type of Incident Percent
Homicide 100.0
Rape 100.0
Suicide 100.0
Forgery/counterfeit 90.4
Kidnapping 73.3
Arson 70.4
Auto theft 65.5
Aggravated assault 64.4
Robbery 62.6
Fraud/embezzlement 59.6
Felony sex crimes 59.0
Common assault 41.8
Nonresidential burglary 36.3
Dead body 35.7
Residential burglary 30.0
Larceny 18.4
Vandalism 6.8
Lost property 0.9
All above types together 32.4
The researchers found that investigators chose the cases on which they
would work "by considering both the seriousness of the crime and
whether sufficient leads are present to indicate that the chances of
clearing the crime are high."57 Thus, a majority of the cases on which
investigators chose to work were cleared by arrest. Most of these cases
were handled in the course of a single day. Only a few types of crimes
involved sustained investigative activity including homicide, rape, safe
burglary, commercial robbery, and forgery/counterfeiting. The Mis-
souri statute of limitations is very similar to the California counterpart,
55. GREENWOOD, CHAIKEN & PETERSILIA, THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS (D.C.
Heath & Co., 1977).
56. Id. at 110 (refer to Table 8-3).
57. Id.
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with a general three year period for felonies, one year for misdemean-
ors, and no limitation for murder or aggravated robberies.58 The con-
clusions of the Rand researchers strongly suggest that neither an
increase nor a reduction in the statute of limitations would significantly
affect the allocation of general investigative resources by the police.59
The motivation factor may have some significance, however, with re-
spect to specialized investigative activities.
In the survey of prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges undertaken
in connection with this article, the respondents were asked to identify
up to six crimes from the list of twenty-four in Appendix III that "are
most susceptible to bureaucratic delays in investigative activity." The
crimes most frequently identified appear in Table 4.
TABLE 4
Defense
Crime Prosecutors (%) Lawyers (%) Judges (%)
1. Corporate
Securities Fraud 64 44 14
2. Conffict of Interest 36 48 28
3. Embezzlement of
Public Funds 40 36 14
4. Fraudulent Claims
Against
Government 36 32 14
5. Payment of Bribe 24 36 56
6. Receipt of Bribe 28 32 70
7. Grand Theft 28 24 0
This list is composed of what, generally, are perceived to be "white
collar" crimes. These crimes are frequently investigated by highly spe-
cialized investigators assigned to special agencies or task forces. The
list also includes many of the offenses for which the statute of limita-
tions commences upon discovery of the crime, because the crime is
58. Mo. CODE, Title 38, c. 556, §556.036.
59. The investigator' daily routine cannot be characterized as devoted primarily to piec-
ing together clues for the purpose of solving crimes. For the most part he operates in a
reactive mode, responding to externally generated events that require an action on his
part. Administrative activities, service to the public, and other work not related to cases
consumes nearly half of his time.
A large number of incidents come to his attention, but many of them receive little or
no work and simply sit on his desk constituting part of his caseload. If an arrest has
already been made, or it is apparent from the crime report that a limited amount of work
will result in an arrest, then the case is pursued and most of the work involves post-arrest
processing, writing reports, documenting evidence, and the like. A small number of
cases are pursued simply because of their seriousness or importance, but it does not
appear that the changes of clearance are enhanced in proportion to the amount of work.
GREENWOOD, supra note 55, at 118.
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often concealed. The "Concealment Factor" will be discussed at
greater length, but the "Motivation Factor" may lead to the conclusion
that suspension of the statute of limitations until the crime is discov-
ered may be a better way to deal with concealed crimes than a longer
statute of limitations. This has particular significance for the crimes of
embezzlement of public funds and falsification of public records, both
of which are presently subject to no limitation, and for the receipt of a
bribe, currently subject to the six year limitation.
C. The Repose Factor
A thoughtful statement of the repose factor was contained in a re-
sponse to the survey questionnaire by a California public defender:
After some period of time, victim, defendant and society adjust to the
commission of a crime. I don't want to bear enmity beyond that
time, nor to live in a society that bears enmity beyond that time,
sufficient to penalize the defendant. Furthermore, today's problems
are sufficient - I don't have the energy to attend to the things that
plagued me years ago.
Although agreement with this sentiment may be strongly affected by
differing views of the purpose of the criminal law--deterrence, incapac-
itation, rehabilitation, or retribution-every one of these purposes
leaves room for a repose factor.
If the person refrains from further criminal activity, the likelihood
increases with the passage of time that he has reformed, diminishing
pro tanto the necessity for imposition of the criminal sanction. If he
has repeated his criminal behavior, he can be prosecuted for recent
offenses committed within the period of limitations. As time goes by,
the retributive impulse which may have existed in the community is
likely to yield place to a sense of compassion for the person prose-
cuted for an offense long forgotten. 60
The length of time that must lapse before punishment is no longer ap-
propriate may be different for every crime. To a large extent, this
length of time will be consistent with the response to the seriousness
factor, in which an attempt is made to identify crimes for which no
repose should be offered. Ultimately, society makes a judgment of how
long it should "bear enmity" for a crime by setting the term of years for
which that offense should be punished. It would be quite inconsistent
to say, simply on the basis of the repose factor, that prosecution for a
crime should be barred three years after commission, when those who
are apprehended at the time of commission are regularly sentenced to
ten years in prison. Thus, it was probably not just coincidence that the
60. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 42, §1.07, at 16.
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one year statute of limitations for misdemeanors is the same as the one
year maximum sentence for misdemeanors in California.6' The maxi-
mum penalty for felonies varies widely, from a maximum of three
years when an offense is simply declared to be a felony, 62 to a maxi-
mum of death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole for
first degree murder when special circumstances are alleged or proven.63
A statute of limitations shorter than the maximum penalty might be
justified by the staleness factor or the motivation factor, but it cannot
be justified by the repose factor. The appropriateness of a statutory
period that exceeds the maximum penalty is considered in connection
with the seriousness factor.
FACTORS SUPPORTING A LONG PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS
Three justifications have been offered in case law and legal literature
for a longer statute of limitations, or in some instances for no statute of
limitations at all. These factors will be characterized as the conceal-
ment factor, the investigation factor, and the seriousness factor.
A. The Concealment Factor
The very nature of certain crimes makes their detection especially
difficult. A longer statute of limitations might be justified for this type
of crime to insure that the perpetrators do not escape punishment sim-
ply by successfully concealing their criminal activity. This is the appar-
ent motivation for exempting embezzlement of public funds and
falsification of public records in section 799 of the California Penal
Code from a statute of limitations. As noted by the court in People v.
Darling:64
an obvious reason for excepting from a statute of limitations the of-
fense of embezzlement of public funds as distinguished from other
forms of theft thereof is that ordinarily the situation giving rise to the
embezzler's theft protects him in keeping his crime a secret. This
conclusion is corroborated by the fact that the offense of falsifying
public records, which arises out of a comparable situation retarding
detection, also is excepted from the subject statute. No reason ap-
pears for having enlarged the scope of these exceptions to encompass
modes of stealing public funds other than that included within the
common law offense of embezzlement. 65
This reasoning is "obvious," however, only when the choice is between
61. CAL. PENAL CODE §19a.
62. Id.
63. Id. §190, 190.1-190.5.
64. 230 Cal. App. 2d 615, 41 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1964).
65. Id. at 621, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
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applying a staiute of limitations or not applying one at all. If a third
alternative is considered, suspending the statute of limitations until the
crime is discovered, a different treatment of the crimes of embezzle-
ment of public funds and falsification of public records may be needed.
In 1891, the California Legislature did not have the sophistication to
create this third choice. As previously noted, the concept of suspending
the statute of limitations until discovery of the crime was not utilized
by the Legislature until 1969.
The survey requested respondents to identify up to six crimes that
are most likely to be concealed. The crimes most frequently listed ap-
pear in Table 5.
TABLE 5
Defense
Crime Prosecutors (%) Lawyers (%) Judges (%)
1. Payment of Bribe 72 72 56
2. Receipt of Bribe 68 76 56
3. Embezzlement of
Public Funds 76 68 84
4. Corporate
Securities Fraud 48 60 56
5. Falsifying Public
Records 44 40 28
6. Fraudulent Claims
Against
Government 44 36 70
7. Child Molesting 48 16 28
Several additional observations about the responses to this question
are pertinent. First, not a single prosecutor, defense lawyer, or judge
listed voluntary or involuntary manslaughter as a crime that is likely to
be concealed. Both of these offenses are currently included among the
offenses for which the three year limitations period commences upon
discovery of the crime. Second, relatively few of the respondents in-
cluded conspiracy in their response (20% of prosecutors, 24% of defense
lawyers, and 28% of judges). This may reflect the adequacy of present
law in dealing with the problem of conspiracy. Conspiracy is treated as
a continuing crime, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until its primary object is completed.66 Courts have been reluctant to
treat concealment as one of the primary objects of a conspiracy, how-
ever, because this would automatically extend the statute of limitations
66. People v. Williams, 97 Cal. App. 3d 382, 390, 158 Cal. Rptr. 778, 782 (1979).
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until the conspiracy was discovered.67 Third, one prosecutor noted that
many defendants charged with concealed crimes are public office hold-
ers, and a longer statute of limitations increases the risk of politically
motivated prosecutions. Finally, the similarity between the offenses
identified as most likely to be concealed, those identified as most sus-
ceptible to bureaucratic delays, and those requiring lengthier investiga-
tive activity, should be noted. While the concealment factor can be
accommodated by suspending the limitations period until discovery,
the motivation and investigation factors cannot, because the investiga-
tion of a crime cannot commence until it has been discovered. In addi-
tion, these two latter factors point in opposite directions in terms of the
appropriate duration of the limitations period.
The survey questionnaire noted that suspension of the limitations pe-
riod until discovery of the crime, or "tolling" the limitation during a
demonstrated period of concealment, are alternatives to a longer period
of limitations for concealed crimes. Respondents were asked to com-
ment on the perceived advantages or disadvantages of these alterna-
tives. Most prosecutors indicated a preference for suspending the
statute until discovery of the crime, suggesting that the burden of af-
firmatively proving concealment is difficult to meet. Several prosecu-
tors suggested that the statute of limitations should not begin to run for
any crime until it has been discovered. A minority opted for a longer
statute of limitations for normally concealed crimes, objecting to hav-
ing to show "diligence" in discovering the crime. In People v. Swin-
ney,68 a California appellate court held that the victim's reasonable
diligence is the issue and official diligence becomes an issue only when
suspicion arrives at the door of the officials responsible for the suspect's
apprehension and prosecution. Furthermore, the court held that "dis-
covery" by the victim means discovery that a criminal agency was re-
sponsible for a loss; mere awareness of a loss would not start the statute
running.
Less agreement was found among defense lawyers and judges, who
were evenly divided among a longer limitations period, commence-
ment of the statute of limitations at discovery, and tolling of the statute.
Several judges and defense attorneys saw practical problems with toll-
ing, since the issue of affirmative concealment could hardly be litigated
without litigating the guilt of the defendant. If the issue was not re-
67. People v. Diedrich, 31 Cal. 3d 263, 595 P.2d 104, 155 Cal. Rprt. 670 (1982); People v.
Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 500 P.2d 610, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1972); People v. Leach, 16 Cal. 3d 419, 541
P.2d 296, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1975); People v. Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d 538, 557 P.2d 75, 134 Cal. Rptr.
784 (1976).
68. 46 Cal. App. 3d 332, 120 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1975).
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solved until trial, one purpose of the statute of limitations would be
defeated: avoiding the burden of a trial for long past offenses. Those
who opposed a longer statute noted the risk of investigative delays and
delayed prosecutions motivated by revenge or political considerations.
B. The Investigation Factor
The nature of some crimes may require longer investigation to iden-
tify the perpetrators. Even after the perpetrators have been identified,
legitimate reasons may exist for investigative activity to continue. As
outlined by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Lovasco ,69 these reasons include the need to identify additional partici-
pants in a criminal enterprise, the need to bolster weaker elements of a
case with additional evidence, and the need to fully explore possible
alternatives to criminal prosecution.7 °
The survey questionnaire asked the respondents to identify up to six
crimes from the list of twenty-four that require lengthier investigative
activity before prosecution is commenced. The crimes most frequently
selected appear in Table 6.
TABLE 6
Defense
Crime Prosecution (%) Lawyers (%) Judges (%)
1. Corporate
Securities Fraud 64 76 100
2. Embezzlement of
Public Funds 68 64 70
3. Fraudulent Claims
Against
Government 56 32 42
4. Conspiracy 48 36 42
5. Receipt of Bribe 44 48 42
6. Payment of*Bribe 40 48 28
7. Conflict of Interest 40 36 28
8. Falsifying Public
Records 32 40 14
The correlation between these crimes and those identified for the
motivation and concealment factors has already been noted. A com-
69. 431 U.S. 783, rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977).
70. Id. at 792-95; see Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial; Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 525 (1975) (additional reasons for investigative delays).
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parison of Tables 4 and 6 reveals that the same crimes which require
lengthy investigative activity are most susceptible to bureaucratic
delay.
C. The Seriousness Factor
The lapse of the statute of limitations operates as a statutory grant of
"amnesty" to an offender. Viewed in this light, it may be desirable to
withhold amnesty from some crimes that are regarded as particularly
serious. This is the other side of the coin already identified as the re-
pose factor. The seriousness of the crime can be a rational considera-
tion ia setting the duration of a limitations period regardless of whether
the purpose of criminal law is deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilita-
tion.7" For example, the following arguments may be made: (a) the
more serious the offense, the greater the need for deterrence and the
less desirable the possibility of escape from punishment after a short
period of limitation, or (b) the more serious the offense, the greater the
likelihood that the perpetrator is a continuing danger to society, and
thus the greater the need to incapacitate the perpetrator when he is
caught, or (c) the more serious the offense, the less likely the perpetra-
tor will reform of his own accord, and thus the greater the need for
compulsory treatment when he is apprehended. It is also true that
when the charge is more serious, more is at stake for the defendant and
the defendant's need for the procedural protection that a limitations
period affords is correspondingly greater. If the purpose of criminal
law is retribution, of course, the seriousness factor would be a para-
mount consideration.
The survey questionnaire asked the respondents to identify up to six
crimes which they regarded as so serious that they should not be sub-
ject to any statute of limitations. The crimes most frequently selected
appear in Table 7.
TABLE 7
Defense
Crime Prosecutors (%) Lawyers (%) jgs (%)
1. Murder 88 76 56
2. Kidnapping 64 20 14
3. Voluntary Manslaughter 52 12 14
4. Rape 48 12 28
5. Forcible Sodomy/
Oral Copulation 40 8 0
71. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 42, §1.07, at 20.
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The broad consensus that prosecution for the crime of murder
should not be barred by a statute of limitations is consistent with the
judgment of every state legislature except one. Only New Mexico,
which imposes a fifteen year limitation, includes murder among the
crimes which may be barred.72 The universality of this judgment re-
flects a number of unique aspects about the crime of murder. Prevail-
ing police practice demands that a file never be closed on an unsolved
murder case. Moreover, murder is the only crime punishable by death
in the vast majority of jurisdictions that have a death penalty. "There
are other crimes of comparable gravity but these crimes are less likely
to present equal obstacles to the prompt discovery of evidence or to
have a comparably long and continuous impact on the sense of general
security within the community. 73
The crimes most frequently selected as so serious that no statute of
limitations should be imposed include the crimes that carry the heavi-
est penalties under the California Penal Code. Murder in the first de-
gree is punishable by death, life imprisonment without possibility of
parole, or twenty-five years to life. Second degree murder is punish-
able by fifteen years to life.7 4 Kidnapping for ransom, reward, extor-
tion or robbery is punishable by life imprisonment, without possibility
of parole if the victim is harmed.75 This correlation is not surprising,
since the judgment of the crimes that are so serious that punishment
should never be barred by lapse of time is very similar to the judgment
of the amount of punishment that is appropriate.
The single exception to this pattern is the inclusion of voluntary
manslaughter by a majority of prosecutors. The punishment for volun-
tary manslaughter76 is less than the penalty for child molesting 77 or
arson of an inhabited structure.78 Other crimes carrying the same pen-
alty as voluntary manslaughter were much further down on the prose-
cutors' list, including mayhem79 (identified by 16% of prosecutors, 8%
of defense lawyers, and no judges) and burglary, 0 (identified by a sin-
gle prosecutor and no defense lawyers or judges). The judgment to
include voluntary manslaughter with murder may reflect the close rela-
tionship between these two crimes and the anomaly of barring prosecu-
tion of a lesser included offense while permitting unlimited prosecution
72. N.M. STAT ANN., §30-1-8 (criminal offenses).
73. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 42, §1.07, at 17.
74. CAL. PENAL CODE §190.
75. Id. §209.
76. Id. §193 (two, four, or six years).
77. Id. §288 (three, six or eight years).
78. Id. §450 (three, five or seven years).
79. Id. §203.
80. Id. §459.
HeinOnline  -- 15 Pac. L. J. 57 1983-1984
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15
of the greater offense. As a practical matter, the ultimate decision of
whether a homicide is a murder or a manslaughter frequently involves
an assessment of the defendant's mental state that must be left to a jury.
Thus, a murder prosecution that is delayed beyond the limitations pe-
riod for voluntary manslaughter may result in the complete acquittal of
the defendant, rather than in conviction for the lesser included
offense.8'
MODERN TRENDS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The movement in the duration of statutes of limitations in other ju-
risdictions can be summarized in one word: up. In 1954, the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review prepared a chart showing the statutory
period for a selected list of crimes in every American jurisdiction. (See
Appendix II) That chart, revealed that twelve states had no statute of
limitations for most felonies. Among those states having a statute of
limitations, the average statutory period for felonies was four years,
with sixteen states establishing the usual period at three years, and
fourteen states setting this period at five or six years. As part of this
study, the limitation periods currently in effect in each state for the
same crimes was ascertained. This information is shaded in parenthe-
ses in Appendix II when different from the 1954 figures. Since the 1954
study, the statutes of limitations in thirty states have been revised.
Five of these states have enacted general increases in the limitations
on felonies: Arizona (five to seven years), Delaware (two to five years),
Florida (two to three years), New Mexico (three to five years), and
South Dakota (three to seven years). With rare exceptions, the only
reductions in the statutory periods have been the creation of a limita-
tions period in jurisdictions that previously had no limitation. Three
states that previously had no statute of limitations enacted a general
limitation of six years (Louisiana, Maryland, and Ohio). Increases in
the statute of limitations for individual crimes have been most frequent
for rape, with eight states increasing the statutory period for that crime.
Today, the average statutory period is still four years, but the number
of states setting the usual period at five or six and even seven years has
grown to nineteen. The general statute of limitations for federal of-
fenses was increased from three years to five years in 1954.82 In the
midst of the massive revision of the federal criminal code, the Federal
Criminal Code Commission proposed that the five year limitations pe-
81. See People v. Picetti, 124 Cal. 361, 362, P. 156, 157 (1899).
82. Ch. 1214, §10, 68 Stat. 1142; renumbered Sept. 26, 1961, as 75 Stat. 648 Pub. L. No. 87-
299; 18 U.S.C. §3282.
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riod be continued. 3
STRIKING A BALANCE: CATEGORIZING THE SERIOUSNESS FACTOR
Many of the factors offered to justify a shorter limitations period di-
rectly conflict with the factors offered to justify a longer period. The
crimes most susceptible to bureaucratic delay (the motivation factor)
require the longest investigations (the investigation factor). Weighing
the importance of the repose and the seriousness factors may turn on
whether the purpose of criminal law is retribution, rehabilitation, de-
terrence or incapacitation. As the drafters of the Model Penal Code
concluded, "[t]o the extent that length of periods of limitation can be
rationalized at all they, like penalty provisions, must be viewed as com-
promises reflecting the multiple and sometimes conflicting aims of the
criminal law." 4
The significance of the purpose of criminal law was certainly borne
out in the survey results. Respondents were asked to enter a plus or a
minus to indicate whether they thought the limitations period should
be increased or decreased for each crime listed in Appendix III. Prose-
cutors generally were in favor of increasing the limitations period, with
a clear majority favoring an increase for the crimes of payment of a
bribe and robbery. Very few prosecutors suggested reducing any peri-
ods except for the crimes of embezzlement of public funds and falsify-
ing public records. Defense lawyers were consistent in opposing any
increases and calling for a decrease in a number of crimes. A majority
favored reduction of the limitations period for forcible sodomy or oral
copulation and for kidnapping. Close to a majority of defense lawyers
wanted reductions for rape, embezzlement of public funds, and falsify-
ing public records.
Except for the factors of seriousness and repose, most of the ratio-
nales for the duration of a statute of limitations do not lend themselves
to categorization by crime. To some extent, the concerns that are im-
plicit in the concealment factor, the staleness factor, and the motiva-
tion/investigation factors can be accommodated by special statutory
exceptions to the general limitations period. This format, which is sug-
gested by the Model Penal Code, could be easily adapted to California
law. The Model Penal Code creates three categories of felony
limitations:
(1) A prosecution for murder may be commenced at any time.
83. S. 1, Ch. 5, §511; See Sen. Jud. Comm. Rep.; Working Papers, Federal Criminal Code
Commission, pp 281-98.
84. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 42, §1.07, at 20.
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(2) A prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be com-
menced within six years after it is committed.
(3) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within
three years after it is committed.85
This classification scheme recognizes that the most significant crime-
specific variable to be considered is the seriousness of the crime. The
Model Penal Code also recognizes that the judgment as to the serious-
ness of a crime is no different than the judgment made in setting the
maximum sentence for the crime. Nevertheless, very few crimes in the
Model Penal Code that are first degree felonies punishable by life
imprisonment.
This approach could be readily adapted to California without ac-
cepting the judgment of the Model Penal Code on which crimes should
be without limitation, or which crimes should be subject to a six year
limitation. One possible adaption appears in Appendix IV, a proposed
draft.
The statute of limitations in New York is similar to the statute rec-
ommended by the Model Penal Code. The limitations period is de-
fined by reference to the maximum penalty for the crimes affected. The
New York statute allows prosecution of a Class A felony to be com-
menced at any time, while prosecution of all other felonies must com-
mence within five years after commission.86 Class A felonies are
punishable by life imprisonment in New York, and these felonies cur-
rently include murder, attempted murder, first degree kidnapping, first
degree conspiracy, first degree drug sales, and first degree arson. 87
Other states that have adopted the Model Penal Code in its entirety
have made substantial modifications in the basic structure of the limita-
tions section. New Jersey has adopted a general limitation of five years
after commission for all crimes except murder, which is subject to no
limitation, and a laundry list of offenses ordinarily committed by pub-
lic officials, subject to a limitation of seven years after commission.88
In Pennsylvania, a three-tiered structure has been adopted, with no
limitation for murder, a five year limitation for six specified first degree
felonies89 and a two year limitation for any other offense.90 In 1980,
the statute was amended to allow prosecution for voluntary man-
slaughter to be commenced at any time.9'
85. Id. §1.06.
86. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW, §30.10.
87. PRACTICE COMMENTARY, I 1A McKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y. ANN., CPL §30.10.
88. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C: 1-6.
89. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. First degree felonies are punishable by a maximum term of ten
years in Pennsylvania. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 106(b)(3). The six offenses enumerated are arson,
burglary, forgery, peIjury, robbery and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. Id.
90. Id. §108; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5552.
91. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5501.
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A. No Limitation
The drafters of the Model Penal Code chose not to impose a statute
of limitations for the crime of murder because of the gravity of the
offense and the impact of the crime on the community. The Advisory
Committee further noted the common police practice of never closing
the files on an unsolved murder case.92 At the time this draft was
adopted, however, the position of the Model Code on the death penalty
was unresolved. The draft now provides for imposition of the death
penalty for only one crime: murder. The judgment that a crime should
be punishable by death is the ultimate determination of its seriousness.
No reason appears why any crime that is punishable by death should
be excepted from the treatment traditionally accorded the crime of
murder. In California, this would mean expanding the list to all capital
crimes including: first degree murder,93 treason,94 procuring execution
by perury,91 train wrecking resulting in death,96 assault with a deadly
weapon by a life term prisoner,97 and making defective war materials
which cause death. 98 It is doubtful that any of these crimes have less
impact on the sense of general security in the community than murder.
While suitability of capital punishment for particular crimes may be
debated, once the judgment that a crime should be punishable by death
is made, prosecution of those crimes should not be barred by a statute
of limitations. If the line is drawn at capital offenses, then kidnapping,
embezzlement of public funds, and falsification of public records would
be eliminated from the current list of offenses subject to no limitation.
No logical reason supports the continued inclusion of kidnapping
among offenses with no limitation, except the seriousness of the life
imprisonment penalty that the crime carries. If, however, kidnapping
remains within the category of offenses subject to no limitations, then
inclusion of all crimes punishable by life imprisonment is supported by
the rationale of seriousness of the penalty. Continuing as no limitation
crimes the embezzlement of public funds and falsification of public
records, however, does not make sense if the possibility of concealing
these crimes is accomodated elsewhere in the code. In terms of serious-
ness as reflected in the three year maximum penalty, these crimes cer-
tainly are out of place in the company of capital offenses.
92. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 42, §1.07, at 17.
93. CAL. PENAL CODE §190.
94. Id. §37.
95. Id. §128.
96. Id. §102.
97. Id. §4500.
98. CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §1672.
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B. Six Year Limitation
The Model Penal Code assessment of the crimes that should be re-
garded as serious enough to qualify for the six year limitations period
can also be modified. The California Penal Code now has a "laundry
list" of serious felonies in Penal Code section 1192.7, added by Proposi-
tion Eight on June 9, 1982. Plea bargaining is precluded for these felo-
nies. In addition, these felonies are also utilized for sentence
enhancement purposes under Penal Code section 667. This list of felo-
nies should not be used to categorize the offenses that are subject to a
longer statute of limitations, although the list may embody a popular
judgment of which felonies the public believes are serious. This would
add a wide variety of disparate crimes not presently subject to the six
year limitation, and would include any felony in which great bodily
injury was inflicted or a firearm was used, thus making the availability
of the six year limitation's period turn on the sentence enhancements
that were pleaded by the prosecution. The list of felonies added by
Proposition 8 includes categories of crimes not defined elsewhere in the
code, such as "burglary of a residence." The list cannot be amended or
modified except by further initiative or by a two thirds vote of the
membership of both houses of the California Legislature. Instead, the
crimes subject to the longer limitations period should be categorized in
terms of the maximum sentence prescribed for the crime. For example,
the statute could read: "A prosecution for an offense punishable by im-
prisonment in the state prison for nine years or more must be com-
menced within six years after it is committed." If a nine year
maximum were established, the six year limitation would include viola-
tions of Penal Code section 451 (arson causing bodily injury); Penal
Code sections 12308-12309 (explosion of destructive device with intent
to murder, or causing bodily injury); and Penal Code section 664 (at-
tempting a crime punishable by life imprisonment). If an eight year
maximum were used, the six year limitation would include all crimes
presently covered by the six year statute, with the exception of Penal
Code sections 286(f) (acceptance of a bribe by a public official) and
288a(f) (sodomy or oral copulation of an unconscious victim). Inclu-
sion of Penal Code section 245(c) (assault with a firearm upon a peace
officer or fireman engaged in performance of duties) would also expand
the serious felonies list.
ACCOMMODATING THE OTHER FACTORS
The Model Penal Code includes a number of exceptions to the gen-
eral limitations determined by the seriousness of the crime. These ex-
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ceptions are designed to accommodate the concerns embodied in the
concealment factor, the motivation/investigation factor, and the stale-
ness factor. Each of these provisions would be readily adaptable to
California law.
A. Accommodating the Concealment Factor
The current provisions of California law reflect a concern that
criminals might escape prosecution by concealing their crimes until af-
ter the statute of limitations has run. California law lists fifteen specific
offenses for which the statute begins to run upon discovery. Other
crimes, such as embezzlement of public money, falsification of public
records, and acceptance of a bribe by a public official, are subjected to
a longer statute of limitations for the same reason. Most of these
crimes have one of two elements in common. They involve either a
fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, or misconduct by a public officer. In
either event, the perpetrator is in a unique position to conceal his
crime. While there is motivation for the concealment of all crime, ordi-
narily it is desireable to start the period of limitations at the time of
commission. When specific types of crimes present an opportunity for
prolonged concealment, however, different treatment is warranted.
The Model Penal Code provides for these two exceptions with the fol-
lowing provisions:
(a) A prosecution for any offense a material element of which is
either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation may be commenced
within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party
or by a person who has legal capacity to represent an aggrieved party
or a legal duty to report such offense and who is himself not a party
to the offense, but in no case shall this provision extend the period of
limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years.
(b) A prosecution for any offense based upon misconduct in office
by a public officer or employee may be commenced within one year
after discovery of the offense by a person having a duty to report
such offense, but in no case shall this provision extend the period of
limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years.99
The proviso that the period of limitations otherwise applicable cannot
be extended more than three years would prevent indefinite suspension
of the statute, and thus accommodate concern for the staleness factor.
As a practical matter, since most of these offenses would ordinarily be
subject to the three year limitations period, a six year ceiling would be
imposed under the Model Penal Code.
The requirement that prosecution be commenced within one year of
99. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 42, §1.07(3).
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the discovery of the crime would only apply if the normal three year
limitation has expired. This, in turn, is a reasonable accommodation
for the motivation factor. The New York Criminal Procedure Law,
enacted in 1970, included a provision closely patterned after this sec-
tion of the Model Penal Code. The New York statute provides as
follows:
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision two, the periods
of limitation for the commencement of criminal actions are extended
as follows in the indicated circumstances:
(a) A prosecution for larceny committed by a person in viola-
tion of a fiduciary duty may be commenced within one year af-
ter the facts constituting such offense are discovered or, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered by
the aggreived party or by a person under a legal duty to repre-
sent him who is not himself implicated in the commission of the
offense.
(b) A prosecution for any offense involving misconduct in pub-
lic office by a public servant may be commenced at any time
during the defendant's service in such office or within five years
after the termination of such service; provided however, that in
no event shall the period of limitation be extended by more than
five years beyond the period otherwise applicable under subdivi-
sion two. 1°°
Notably, a maximum limitation on the extension permitted was deleted
from paragraph (a), while paragraph (b) was modified by having the
statute begin to run not from discovery of the offense, but from the
office holder's departure from office. Commentators explained the ne-
cessity of the latter change by noting the inherent probability that mis-
conduct by public officials will remain concealed until the offender
leaves office.' 0 '
In People v. Glowa,'0 2 a New York court upheld the constitutionality
of this provision against a claim that the provision denied public office
holders equal treatment under the law. The court held that special
treatment of office holders was justified by the rationale expressed in
the practice commentary:
Because of the inherent nature of the circumstances under which
such offenses are committed, their commission is often not discov-
ered until the incumbent public servant has left office. 10 3
Pennsylvania also modified the Model Penal Code provision relating
to offenses committed by public officers. As originally adopted, the
100. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW §30.10.
101. PRACTICE COMMENTARY, McKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y., ANN. CPL §30.10.
102. 384 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
103. Id. at 676.
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provision permitted prosecution at any time while the defendant is in
office or within two years thereafter, with a maximum extension of the
normal limitations of up to three additional years." In 1978, the pro-
vision was amended to extend the period to five years after the defend-
ant leaves office, with a maximum extension of eight years longer than
the normal limitation. 0 5
The New York and Pennsylvania modifications of the Model Penal
Code provision create a substantial risk to public office holders that
prosecution may be motivated by political retaliation for long forgotten
offenses. These modifications provide no accommodation to motivate
prompt investigation upon discovery of the offense. On the other hand,
paragraph (b) of the Model Penal Code may be unrealistic in employ-
ing discovery of the offense as the trigger, since the only person in a
position to report the crime may be under the control of the office
holder, or even a participant in the offense. Paragraph (b) should be
modified to repeat the language of paragraph (a), which triggers the
statute upon discovery by a person having a duty to report the offense
"and who is himself not a party to the offense." A clause should also
be inserted to allow the prosecution to be commenced within one year
of the termination of service in office, subject to the three year ceiling
on extensions. These modifications have been incorporated in the draft
attached as Appendix IV.
B. Accommodating the Motivation/Investigation Factor
By permitting prosecution of some offenses three years after discov-
ery, the present California statute of limitations allows the indefinite
suspension of the statute until discovery. If discovery of an offense is
delayed, prompt investigation of the offense should be given highest
priority. Thus, the Model Penal Code requires commencement of pros-
ecution within one year under circumstances when the normal period
of limitations has been extended. One year seems adequate to com-
plete these types of investigations. Since by definition these situations
involve criminal conduct completed more than three years and as much
as six years earlier, the risks encompassed by the staleness factor cer-
tainly justify a requirement that the investigation be promptly
completed.
C. Accommodating the Staleness Factor
While this article has concluded that the staleness factor is not crime
104. 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. Section 108 (1972).
105. 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §108 (Supp. 1982).
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specific, certain categories of crimes present unique risks of staleness
since by their nature, they are susceptible to fraudulent prosecution.
The Model Penal Code deals with these crimes individually because of
the unique drafting problems that were anticipated. 10 6 The Model
Code provides that no prosecution of rape and related offenses may be
commenced unless notice is given to officials within six months of the
occurrence or, if an incompetent is involved, within six months after a
competent person learns of the offense.'0 7 The Model Code also pro-
vides that no prosecution of a theft by a spouse or by members of the
household may be commenced unless a complaint is made within six
months after the victim learns of the offense and the probable identity
of the offender. 10 8 In both of these situations, the statute of limitations
may, for all practical purposes, be reduced to six months, provided that
knowledge of the offense comes to the attention of the victim.
Since the California Penal Code contains no requirement of prompt
complaint for specific substantive offenses, some provision that takes
this factor into consideration should be incorporated into the statute of
limitations. The provision could take one of two forms. First, a com-
mon element pervading the offenses that require a prompt complaint is
the proof of a lack of consent by the victim. Requiring the victim com-
plain promptly within a shorter period of time than the three or six year
period encompassed in the statute of limitations does not seem to be an
unreasonable requirement. The six month period established by the
Model Penal Code also appears reasonable, so long as exceptions are
recognized for incompetent victims and victims who do not discover
the offense.
106. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 42, §1.07, at 22. Finally, should special short peri-
ods of limitation be prescribed for offenses which by their nature are likely to be the
subject of fraudulent prosecutions? Some provision of this sort is needed. The choice is
whether to include it in a general section or to deal with each situation specifically in the
section defining the offense by requiring, for example, that the victim of the offense make
a complaint within a certain period of time. Since the number of such situations may be
numerous and since the specific needs may vary from offense to offense, facility in draft-
ing and in use of the code will be furthered if specific provisions of this sort are included
with the substantive offense rather than in a general section. That has been the assump-
tion to date. See: Section 207.4, Rape and related Offenses, Sub-Section (5): Prompt
Complaint; Cooroboration, providing that no prosecution may be commenced unless
notice is given to officials within six months of occurrence; or, if an incompetent is in-
volved, within six months after a competent person learns of the offense; Section 206.13,
Theft by Spouse; Other Members of Household: Servants, Sub-Section (4): Necessity of
Prompt Complaint, providing that no prosecution may be commenced unless complaint
within six months after victim learns of the offense and the probable identity of the
offender. In both of these situations the statute of limitations may for all practical pur-
poses be reduced to six months, provided of course that the knowledge of the offense
comes to the attention of the victim. If upon completion of the substantive portions of
the code it appears that such provisions are numerous and that they are capable of gener-
alization, it may be worthwhile to consider adding them to the general provisions. Id
107. See id. §207.4(5).
108. See id. §206.13(4).
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Alternatively, the statute could enumerate the offenses in which a
prompt complaint is required. An enumeration of Penal Code sections
261 (rape), 286 (sodomy), 288a (oral copulation), and 289 (rape by a
foreign object), would appear warranted. These sections also are enu-
merated in the definition of consent contained in Penal Code section
261.6.
Both alternatives are presented in section (4) of the draft in Appen-
dix IV. The language is based on section 207.4(5) of the Model Penal
Code, requiring prompt complaint for rape and related offenses. Even
if the perpetrator remained unidentified, the section would permit the
normal limitations period to apply, so long as prompt complaint was
made.
Under neither alternative of the proposed prompt complaint require-
ment do the crimes of child molestation in violation of California Penal
Code section 288, or unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under
age eighteen in violation of California Penal Code section 261.5, apply.
Lack of consent by the victim is not an element of either offense, nor is
consent an affirmative defense. Thus, the problem encountered in the
Pennsylvania enactment of a prompt complaint requirement will be
avoided. When Pennsylvania adopted the Model Penal Code in 1972,
a prompt complaint requirement was enacted to apply to all sexual of-
fenses, including statutory rape and corruption of a minor." 9 In 1976,
a case arose in which a fifteen year old girl was seduced by her stepfa-
ther. Although she immediately reported the incident to her mother,
the mother disbelieved her and sent the girl to live with an aunt and
uncle. The girl also related the incident to them, but no action was
taken to report the incident to authorities until one year later, when the
mother filed an unrelated assault complaint against the stepfather.
Based on these facts, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the
charges had to be dismissed under the prompt complaint statute.' 10 Af-
ter this case was submitted to the appellate court, the Pennsylvania
Legislature repealed the prompt complaint statute before the opinion
was even announced."'
One other accommodation to the staleness factor is advisable. Even
if a crime is concealed or the statute is tolled for some other reason, an
indefinite suspension of any limitation period does not appear desira-
ble, especially when the limitations period is already as long as six
years. The normal retention period for documents and records has
elapsed, and the risk that essential witnesses are unavailable becomes
109. 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §3105 (1972).
110. Commonwealth v. Shade, 363 A.2d 1187 (Pa. Super. 1976).
111. 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §3105 (1976); Commonwealth, 363 A.2d at 1191.
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too substantial. Thus, the Model Penal Code puts a "cap" on the ex-
ceptions to the normal limitations period of three additional years. Ar-
guably, this permits a defendant to avoid prosecution by concealing his
crime as long as he succeeds three years beyond the normal limitations
period. This argument has apparently persuaded many states to permit
indefinite suspension of the statute. This overlooks the following
considerations:
(1) The public has an interest in having legal disputes accurately
resolved on the basis of evidence that is not stale.
(2) The factual issues involving tolling or suspension of the statute
may themselves have to be litigated on the basis of stale evidence.
(3) Any affirmative acts of concealment delay commencement of
the limitations period to the extent that they are part of a "continuing
crime."15 12
(4) If the person refrains from further criminal activity, the likeli-
hood increases with the passage of time that he has reformed, dimin-
ishingpro tanto the necessity for imposing the criminal sanction. If
he has repeated his criminal behavior, he can be prosecuted for re-
cent offenses committed within the period of limitation.113
(5) Blackmail based upon a threat to prosecute or disclose evidence
to enforcement officials is made less possible. After some defined
period of time, a person ought to be allowed to live without fear of
prosecution. 114
These considerations justify an accommodation for the staleness factor,
placing an absolute limit of three years beyond the normal limitation
period when exceptions or tolling provisions apply.
COMMENCEMENT OF PROSECUTIONS
As previously noted, the California Penal Code currently has two
alternative provisions determining when prosecution is commenced for
purposes of the statute of limitations. The provision now in effect re-
quires the filing of an indictment or the issuance of an arrest warrant.
In the event that Hawkins v. Superior Court"5 is abrogated, California
will revert to the previous requirement that an indictment or an infor-
mation be filed, or that a case certified to the superior court before the
prosecution is deemed to have commenced.
The Model Penal Code provides that a prosecution is commenced by
either indictment or issuance of a warrant, but requires that the war-
112. See People v. Swinney, 46 Cal. App. 3d 332, 340, 120 Cal. Rptr. 148, 1533 (1975).
113. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 42, §1.07, at 16.
114. lb.
115. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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rant be executed without unreasonable delay. The reason for this qual-
ification was explained in the following commentary:
There is a danger that a warrant may be issued and allowed to lie
around without diligent effort to execute it. See e.g. State v. Bowman,
106 Kan. 430 (1920) (warrant issued but at direction of county attor-
ney, the sheriff made no effort to serve it for five months). The draft
requires that the warrant be executed within a reasonable time. This
was the conclusion of the Kansas court in State v. Bowman, supra. In
determining what is reasonable, factors such as the inability to find
the accused, the fact that the accused is in prison, and others to nu-
merous to specify in a statute may be taken into account.'t 6
Creating a "condition subsequent" to the commencement of prosecu-
tion, however, injects unnecessary uncertainty into the law. The dili-
gence of serving of the warrant will be a hotly contested issue in virtu-
ally every case in which the limitations period expired after issuance of
the warrant but before its service, and the defendant may be highly
motivated to avoid service of the warrant. A preferable solution would
be to permit the issuance of the warrant to commence prosecution, and
leave any question of delay in executing the warrant to be resolved as a
constitutional claim of denial of the right to a speedy trial.' This
could create potential for substantial abuse, however, if "John Doe"
warrants" t8 were permitted to circumvent the statue of limitations. The
problem is avoided in the proposed draft, however, by requiring that
the arrest warrant name the defendant to commence prosecution for
the purpose of the statue of limitations."I9
TOLLING PROVISIONS
The current California provision for tolling the statute of limitations,
116. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 42, §1.07, at 24-26.
117. See Jones v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 2d 733, 46 P.2d 147 (1970). The court held that a
nineteen month delay in the execution of an arrest warrant deprived the defendant of the right to
a speedy trial. Federal courts analyze a delay in arrest in terms of a denial of the right to due
process. Id.; see also, e.g., Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Whether a delay
is analyzed in terms of the right to a speedy trial or the right to due process can make a significant
difference. Id.; f, United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars, - U.S. -
(May 23, 1983). The Court declared that issuance of an arrest warrant to commence prosecution
makes the constitutional right to speedy trial clearly applicable. Id.
118. CAL. PENAL CODE §815 (permits the issuance of a warrant designating the defendant "by
any name" if the name of the defendant is unknown to the magistrate); People v. Montoya, 255
Cal. App. 2d 137, 63 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1967) (the court held that a warrant must still meet the consti-
tutional requirement of a "particular description."). A warrant describing the defendant as "John
Doe, white male adult," was declared void as "too general a description." Id.
119. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE §§959(4), 989 (permits the indictment of a defendant by other than
his true name, if his true name is unknown). This procedure has been used to indict a defendant
by his first name when a physical description is available. See People v. McCrae, 218 Cal. App.
2d 725, 32 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1963); People v. Ervin, 189 Cal. App. 2d 283, It Cal. Rptr. 203 (1961).
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Penal Code section 802, excludes any time the defendant is outside the
state, for whatever reason, from the statutory period. If a defendant
has changed his identity and concealed himself in another city, but did
not cross the state border, the statute would not be tolled. t2 If the
defendant is drafted into the armed services and sent overseas, the stat-
ute would be tolled. To permit tolling without reference to the purpose
of the absence, and to preclude tolling simply because a fugitive from
justice stays within the state borders makes little sense. Both of these
anomalies would be corrected by paragraph (6)(a) of Model Penal
Code, which has been included in the draft in Appendix IV. This pro-
vision is based upon the theory that deliberate impediments to an in-
vestigation warrant the tolling of the statute. Many other jurisdictions
require that absence be "with a purpose to avoid detection," therefore
ample case law has construed the language of the Model Code.12'
An additional tolling provision from the Model Penal Code is in-
cluded as paragraph (6)(b) of the draft in Appendix IV. This provision
simply excludes from the limitations period any length of time in which
a prosecution for the same conduct is pending. Thus, if an indictment
or information is dismissed for a technical defect and the double jeop-
ardy clause or a statue would not preclude reprosecution, the statute of
limitations will not have run during the pendency of the prosecution.
A similar tolling provision is now included in Penal Code section 802.5,
but this provision only permits recommencing the same "criminal ac-
tion" that was dismissed, which is an unnecessarily narrow concession.
Section 802.5 is also a temporary measure which will be automatically
repealed if Hawkins v. Superior Court is abrogated. 22 No reason exists
to explain why a tolling provision similar to the one embodied in the
Model Penal Code should not become a permanent part of the Califor-
nia Penal Code. The "same conduct" standard is designed to give
maximum flexibility to the prosecution while protecting the defendant
against enhancement of the charges after the statute has run.
The draft is broader than current statutes in that it provides that
the statute does not run during the time that a prosecution is pending
for the same conduct. It is sometimes said that the tolling only ap-
plies to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. See 90 A.L.R.
120. Exparte Vice, 5 Cal. App. 153, 158, 89 P. 983, 988 (1907).
121. Donnell v. United States, 229 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1956); Taylor v. State, 292 N.W. 233(Neb. 1940); State v. Williams, 69 A.2d 299 (Del. 1949); People v. Guariglia, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 96(1946); Annot., 124 A.L.R. 1049 (1940). The language in Penal Code section 802 permitting
charges to be brought although the defendant was outside the state at the time of the offense is
unnecessary, since Penal Code section 27 clearly applies. Penal Code section 27(a)3 states: "All
who, being without this state, cause or aid, advise or encourage, another person to commit a crime
within this state, and are afterwards found therein."
122. See supra note 37.
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452, 461. If this means a violation of the same statute based upon the
same facts, it is too narrow, since the dismissal may have been based
upon a substantial variation between the previous allegations and the
proof. Other statutes require that the subsequent prosecution be for
an offense arising out of the same transaction. See N.M. Stats. Ann.
sec. 41-9-3 (1953): ". . . provided that the offense last charged is
based upon, or grows out of, the same transaction upon which the
first indictment was founded." The test of the same conduct, involv-
ing as it does some flexibility of definition, states a principle that
should meet the reasonable needs of prosecution, while affording the
defendant fair protection against an enlargement of the charges after
running of the statute.1
23
RETROACTIVITY OF CHANGES
The changes suggested in the proposed draft based upon the Model
Penal Code will have the effect of increasing the limitations period for
some crimes and shortening the period for others. This result raises the
issue of whether changes in the length of limitation periods can apply
retroactively to crimes committed before adoption of the changes.
With respect to a shortened period, there is no constitutional obstacle
either to giving retroactive effect or to denying it. Retroactivity would
confer a benefit on the defendant not presently available. Whether that
benefit is conferred would simply be a question of legislative intent.
The legislature could provide that the shortening of the limitations pe-
riod for any offense will not apply to crimes committed prior to the
effective date of the change.' 4 Legislative intent should be clearly
stated to avoid judicial confusion and inconsistency. The most sensible
approach would be to allow any shortened period to apply retroac-
tively. Since the legislative enactment embodies a judgment that the
lapse of time should bar prosecution, to deny the benefits of this judg-
ment to those who committed offenses prior to enactment, while con-
ferring the benefits upon subsequent offenders, is incongruous. The
result is particularly unfair because it could lead to the prosecution of
offenders whose crimes preceded the barred crimes of more recent
offenders.
The constitutionality of retroactive application of extended periods
of limitation frequently has been litigated, both in California and else-
where. The leading case on this issue is Falter v. United States,'25 in
which Judge Learned Hand said the statute could be extended "while
123. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 42, §1.07, at 27-28.
124. Cf. Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 611 (1973); Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653,
659 (1974).
125. 23 F.2d 420 (2nd Cir. 1928), cert. dem 277 U.S. 590 (1928).
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the chase is on." As long as the original period has not expired, an
extension of the period would not violate the constitutional prohibition
of ex post facto laws.
California courts have employed the same distinction in applying the
expostfacto prohibition of article I, section 9 of the California Consti-
tution. In Sobiek v. Superior Court,12 6 the court held that a prosecution
for forgery was barred despite the 1970 amendment of Penal Code sec-
tion 800 providing that the three year statute of limitations for forgery
commences upon discovery, rather than at commission. Although the
forgery had been discovered within the previous three year period, the
crime had been committed more than three years prior to enactment of
the amendment. Thus, the court concluded, "[t]he statute of limitations
having run prior to the amendment extending it, application of the
amendment to petitioner's situation would constitute application of ex
post facto legislation."' 12 7
When the previous period of limitations has not expired at the time
that an amendment extending the statute of limitations is enacted, Cali-
fornia courts have applied the extension to crimes committed prior to
the amendment. In People v. Eitzen,' 28 a former deputy sheriff was
charged with embezzlement of property entrusted to his care during a
period of employment from November 11, 1966, to September 23,
1969. Allegedly, the loss was not discovered until October 7, 1972, and
an information was filed on April 9, 1973. An amendment of Penal
Code section 800 provided a limitations period for grand theft that ran
from the time that the offense was discovered. Since the amendment
was enacted November 10, 1969, the previous limitation of three years
after commission had not yet run at the time of the amendment, and
the court held that the new statutory period would apply. 29
CONCLUSION
A variety of factors have been advanced to justify a short statute of
limitations, including the staleness of evidence, the need for repose,
and the need to motivate prompt investigation. A countervailing set of
factors, which could justify a longer statutory period or no limitation at
all, include the preclusion of amnesty for serious crimes, the need for
lengthier investigations of complex crimes, and the preclusion of avoid-
ing prosecution by concealment of the crime. An analysis of these fac-
tors, including the survey responses of judges, prosecutors, and defense
126. 28 Cal. App. 3d 846, 106 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1972).
127. Id. at 851, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
128. 43 Cal. App. 3d 253, 117 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1974).
129. Accord People v. Swinney, 46 Cal. App. 3d 332, 120 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1975).
HeinOnline  -- 15 Pac. L. J. 72 1983-1984
1983 / Statute of Limitations
lawyers, supports the conclusion that, with the exception of seriousness
and repose, these factors are not crime specific. Their applicability de-
pends more upon the particular circumstances of a case and the evi-
dence used than upon the nature of the crime itself. The repose factor
is closely related to the seriousness factor since the residuum of com-
munity outrage over a crime directly relates to its seriousness. There-
fore, the principal determinant of the appropriate duration of a statute
of limitations should be the seriousness of the crime.
A workable model for gauging the duration of the statute of limita-
tions by the seriousness of the offense can be found in the Model Penal
Code, which has been used in New York and Pennsylvania. The Code
permits accommodation of the ordinary statutory period when factors
such as concealment or staleness become significant. While this accom-
modation injects some uncertanity into the law by creating issues that
can be litigated, these issues may be litigated in any case, if not to de-
termine the applicability of the statute of limitations, then to test the
constitutionality of the prosecution under the due process clause.
The Model Penal Code can be readily adapted to California law,
even though California does not categorize felonies by levels of serious-
ness, as does the Model Penal Code. Ultimately, the legislature will
engage in the same process of categorization by establishing the maxi-
mum penalty for an offense under the California Determinate Sentenc-
ing Law. An attempt to adapt the approach of the Model Penal Code
to make sense out of the California criminal statute of limitations ap-
pears as Appendix IV of this article.
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APPENDIX I
CURRENT CALIFORNIA STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
California felonies presently fall into one of four categories with re-
spect to the Statute of Limitations. The date each offense was added to
a particular category is indicated in parentheses.
A. No Limitation - Penal Code §799
Penal Code §187 - Murder (1872)
Penal Code §424 - Embezzlement of Public Moneys (1891)
Gov't. Code §6200 et seq. - Falsification of Public Records (1891)
Penal Code §209 - Kidnapping (1970)
B. Six Years After Commission of Crime - Penal Code §800(b)
Penal Code §§68, 85, 93, 165;
Elec. Code §29160 - Acceptance of bribe by public Official
(1941)
Penal Code §261 - Rape (1981)
Penal Code §264.1 - Rape Acting in Concert (1981)
Penal Code §286(c) - Sodomy by force or with Person under
14 (1981)
Penal Code §286(d) - Sodomy Acting in Concert (1981)
Penal Code §286(f) - Sodomy with Unconscious Victim (1981)
Penal Code §288 - Lewd Acts with Person under 14 (1981)
Penal Code §288a(c) - Oral Copulation by force or with Person
Under 14 (1981)
Penal Code §288a(d) - Oral Copulation Acting in Concert (1981)
Penal Code §288a(f) - Oral Copulation with Unconscious
Victim (1981)
Penal Code §289 - Rape by foreign object (1981)
C. Three Years After Discovery of Crime - Penal Code §800(c)
Penal Code §487 - Grand Theft (1969)
Penal Code §470 - Forgery (1970)
Penal Code §192(1) - Voluntary Manslaughter (1971)
Penal Code §192(2) - Involuntary Manslaughter (1971)
Penal Code §72 - Fraudulent Claim Against Government
(1972)
Penal Code §118 - Perjury (1972)
Penal Code §118a - False Affidavit (1972)
Gov't. Code §1090 - Conflict of Interest by Public Official
(1972)
Gov't. Code §27443 - Conflict of Interest by Public
Administrator (1972)
Penal Code §132 - Offering False Evidence (1975)
Penal Code §134 - Preparing False Evidence (1975)
Corp. Code §25540 - All violations of Corporate Securities
Law (1978)
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Corp. Code §25541 - Fraud in offer, purchase or sale of
Securities (1978)
Welf. & Inst. Code - Welfare Fraud (1981)
§11483
Wel. & Inst. Code - Medi-Cal Fraud (1982)
§14107
D. Three Years After Commission of Crime - Penal Code §800(a)
All felonies not specified
above.
California misdemeanors are all subject to a Statute of Limitations of
one year after commission. Penal Code §801(a). If an offense may be
punished as either a felony or a misdemeanor, the felony Statue of
Limitations applies. Penal Code §801(b).
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APPENDIXI
CRIMINAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
IN THE INITED STATES
LIMITATION OF PROSECUTIONS IN YEARS
STATE CRIME'
AND STATUTE
Z
-DENOTES CHAN~GE IN LIMITATION U
PERIOD SINCE 1954 0
Z~
0 < j
Alabama§15-3-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Alaska§12.10.010 5 0 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 3 5
Arizona §13-107 Crim Code : 0 0 ::::> :::: *: :: : ;i4': 7 :::7:
..X;. . ,...... : ... : .,-- .- . ( ... ..... ;; ......
Arkansas§43-1601 &-1602 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 3
California Pen Cod §§799, 800, 801 3 0 3t 3 : 3 3- 3 3 3
Colorado §16-5-401 : 0 3 3 3 3 0 3 0 3 3
Connecticut§54-193 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Delaware Titlel11§205 5 0 5 35 5 5
Florida Title 44 §775.15 : 0 3 ..... 0 :.. 4 3
Georgia Title 27 §27-601 (30 P.C.) 7 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Hawaii Title 37 §701-108 V 0 3f" 3 6 3 3 6 6 6 3
Idaho Title 19 §19-401, 402, 403 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Illinois Chapter 38 §3-5 0 0 0 3 3 0 3 3 3 3
Indiana §35-41-4-2 0 0 5 St 5 5 sf0 1 5
Iowa Chap 802 §803.1 Cod Crim Pro 3 0 3 3 : 3 3 3 3 3 3
Kansas Crim Code Title 31 §21-3106 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Kentucky Pen Cod §500.050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Louisiana Title 17 Chap 1 Art. 571,2 0 0 6 X X:: X :: :6 4 :
Maine Title 17-A §8A 0 0 6 -A, 6 6 6 6 6 6
Maryland Gen Laws Chap 277 §63 : Of 6 .:: ::: (3:I-i::& 6 i:i:: :
!:. ::.:.:... .... .......,........  - :, , . .... ..
Massachusetts Gen Law Chap 277 §63 6 0 6 6 6 6 6 ! 6 6 6
Michigan Title 28 §28.964 6 0 6 6 6 6 6 6 10 6 6
Minnesota Min Stat§ 628.26 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Mississippi Title 99 Chap 1 §99-1-5 : 0 2 2 2
Missouri Title 38 Chap 556 §556.036 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
(copied from University of Pennsylvania Law Review)
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LIMITATION OF PROSECUTIONS
STATE CRIME*
AND STATUTE
NerakaCdCrm r At §9o10 0 0 .... 3 0~ 3~ 3
0
Nevada Title 14 §171.080 &.085 3 0 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3
New ampshie Title 62 Chap 625§625.8 6i~ii 0 6 6::i:i:i : :i~:  6f 6iiiii 6 6 6
New Jersey Title 2C §2C.1-6 5:iii 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 iii~i 5 5
:Ji::! :::::':::
New Mexico Chap 30 Crim Off §30-1-8 Ii: ii i~i: 5 ii!i iiiii~ii .5 ii i~~:i iiil 6 iii
Nework Title 4C Art30§3010 m 5 0 5 
5
NorthCa Cd Crim Pro Ar t 129-A10 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0
North Dakota Ch 294§29-04-01, -03 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Ohio Title 29 §2901.13 iiii 0 6 !iii: :: ::i! ;6i; l~ i i:i:~!:: i:i 6 i:~:
Oklahoma Title 22 Ch3 §151 Crim Pro 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 3
Oregon Title 4 Ch C3§131.125RevSat 3 0 0 3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 3
Pennsylvania 18 Pa. C.S. A §108 5 0 Of 5 5 5 5 5  5
5
N o rk TitleC A rtsa30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 5 0 0
South CarolinaP 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0
South Dakota Ttle 23 S CL § - 0 o 3 3 3 73 
3'
Tennesse,40 TCA§40-201 4 0 4 4 0 4 4 4 4 4 4
Ohio 0il 09 52901513 5 3610 X
Texas V.A.C Crim Proc §12.01 5 0 0 5 5 5 
5
UtahCIanCod §75-1-301&302,303 4 0 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4
Vermont §4501 Crimes & Cri Pro. iii 0 3 i:i 3 6 6 6 il~ii 3
.:.::.- -. 0 0
VirginiaCodCrimPro§l.2-243: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0
Washington Title 9A Wa. Crim CdCh 3 0 3 Of 3 
3 3 3 3 3
Ta s04 § A. 04 o § 200 0 55
West Virginia §61-11-9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0
Wisconsin Wis Crim Cod §939.74 6 0 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 1I"
Wyoming- 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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APPENDIX III
Responses to Survey by Prosecutors (P), Defense Lawyers
(D), and Judges (J)
Too Short Too Long
Crime Current (%) (%)
S/L P D J P D J
ARSON 3 44 4 28 0 4 0
PAYMENT OF BRIBE 3 52 8 42 0 8 0
RECEIPT OF BRIBE 6 16 12 28 16 32 28
BURGLARY 3 36 0 0 0 8 0
CHILD MOLESTING' 61 - - -
CONFLICT OF INTEREST 33 24 0 0 4 8 0
COUNTERFEITING 3 24 0 14 0 8 0
CONSPIRACY 3 36 0 56 0 12 0
EMBEZZLEMENT OF PUBLIC
FUNDS 0 8 0 0 24 48 0
FALSIFYING PUBLIC RECORDS 0 4 0 0 24 48 0
FRAUDULENT CLAIMS
AGAINST GOVERNMENT 33 20 4 14 0 8 0
FORGERY 3 24 0 0 0 8 0
GRAND THEFT 2  33 40 0 14 0 12 0
KIDNAPPING 0 0 0 0 4 52 0
MURDER 0 0 0 0 0 20 0
MANSLAUGHTER-VOL. 33 48 8 14 0 4 0
MANSLAUGHTER-INVOL. 33 44 8 0 0 4 0
MAYHEM 3 36 8 0 0 8 0
PERJURY 33 20 4 14 0 8 0
RAPE 6 36 8 0 8 48 14
FORCIBLE SODOMY/ORAL
COPULATION 6 36 8 0 8 52 14
ROBBERY 3 56 8 0 0 8 0
CORPORATE SECURITIES
FRAUD 33 24 4 28 0 4 0
SALES OF NARCOTICS 3 24 0 0 0 24 0
I On the questionnaire circulated, the statute of limitations for child molesting was erroneously
listed as 3 years, thus invalidating the results for this item on the survey.
2 Grand Theft includes Embezzlement of private funds, False Pretenses and Larceny. See
Cal.Pen.Code §484.
3 Statute of limitations commences to run three years after discovery of crime.
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APPENDIX IV
PROPOSED DRAFT
Caifornia Penal Code §800
Time Limitations
(1) A prosecution for an offense punishable by death (life imprison-
ment) may be commenced at any time.
(2) Prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods
of limitation:
(a) A prosecution for an offense punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison for nine (eight) years or more must be com-
menced within six years after it is committed.
(b) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced
within three years after it is committed.
(3) Even if the period prescribed in subsection (2) has expired:
(a) A prosecution for any offense a material element of which is
either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation may be com-
menced within one year after discovery of the offense by an
aggrieved party or by a person who has legal capacity to rep-
resent an aggrieved party or a legal duty to report such of-
fense and who is himself not a party to the offense, but in no
case shall this provision extend the period of limitation
otherwise applicable by more than three years.
(b) A prosecution for any offense based upon misconduct in of-
fice by a public officer, employee or appointee may be com-
menced within one year after termination of the defendant's
service in such office or within one year after discovery of the
offense by a person having a duty to report such offense and
who is himself not a party to the offense, but in no case shall
this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise ap-
plicable by more than three years.
(4) No prosecution for (any offense a material element of which is
lack of consent by the victim) (any violation of Sections 261, 286,
288a or 289 of the Penal Code) may be commenced unless the
offense was brought to the notice of public authority by complaint
or otherwise within 6 months after its commission (or discovery)
or, where the victim was less than 16 years old or otherwise in-
competent to make complaint, within 6 months after a parent,
guardian or other competent person specially interested in the vic-
tim, learns of the offense.
(5) A prosecution is commenced either when an indictment is re-
turned or when an arrest warrant naming the defendant is issued.
(6) The period of limitation does not run:
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(a) during any time when the accused, with a purpose to avoid
detection, apprehension or prosecution, is outside the state or
is absent from his usual place of abode within the state, but
in no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation
otherwise applicable by more than three years; or
(b) during any time when a prosecution against the accused for
the same conduct is pending in this state.
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